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 The most significant clashes between great powers are occurring on land. Rus-sia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, the rivalry between Iran and the United States 
and its regional allies, the lengthy conflict in Afghanistan, and the expansion of 
China’s influence along its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) vectors—these are just a 
few illustrations of the persistent vying for continental political control and influ-
ence. For a maritime power such as the United States, these conflicts—with the 
exception of China’s naval actions in the South China Sea—present a peculiar and 
recurrent challenge, because they take place on continental Eurasia and not on 
the sea. The United States needs superior naval power and command over mari-
time access routes to be able to project its will across the oceans. But the other 
players—from Russia to China and Iran—enjoy internal, continental lines of 
communication that, while perhaps not as cost-effective as maritime routes, can 
be shorter and are less vulnerable to seaborne predations. As a result, from the 
perspective of the United States, sea power is necessary but also has serious limits.
The key question for any maritime power is how to translate its control over the 
sea into political influence over the land. This conversion of sea power into strate-
gic effects on the continent is neither guaranteed nor easy. Sailing undisturbed on 
the oceans does not mean that a sea power, such as the United States, has political 
influence on land; control of the sea does not yield power automatically over the 
land. This recurrent question and the attendant challenge are not insurmountable, 
of course, and throughout history maritime states 
have pursued strategies to alleviate the limits of sea 
power and use their maritime superiority to shape 
political dynamics on land. Blockading their rivals, 
controlling inland seas, keeping a substantial conti-
nental presence, seeking the support of proxy forces 
and land-based allies, and—on a grand-strategy 
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level—managing rather than defeating the continental rival are some of the ap-
proaches that sea powers have adopted to deal with their own limits. But these 
limits are enduring, requiring continued attention; they never can be overcome 
fully—they only can be mitigated.
Even raising the possibility that sea powers have inherent weaknesses goes 
against a Mahan-inspired partiality for the historical superiority of maritime 
states. Captain (later Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, was the “evangelist of 
sea power,” writing for a rising maritime power and passionately trying to con-
vince his American audience of the greatness of sea power and the importance of 
having a navy.1 He pointed out persuasively that sea-lanes were of greater strategic 
value than land routes, and thereby highlighted the importance of who controlled 
them. “Land carriage . . . toils enviously but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to 
replace and supplant the royal highway of nature’s own making.”2 Several decades 
before Mahan, John Adams had summed up this great faith in maritime power 
eloquently. In an 1802 letter, he wrote, 
The council which Themistocles gave to Athens—Pompey to Rome—Cromwell 
to England—DeWitt to Holland—and Colbert to France, I have always given, and 
shall continue to give to my countrymen—That as the great questions of commerce 
between nations and empires must be decided by a military marine, and war or  
peace are determined by sea, all reasonable encouragement should be given to a  
navy. The trident of Neptune is the sceptre of the world.3
Undoubtedly, control of the sea is a precondition for any far-reaching policy that 
a power such as the United States may want to pursue; without it, the United States 
is severed from the rest of the world, turning into an isolated, continental island, 
not only impotent but vulnerable to the seaborne attacks of adversaries.4 Moreover, 
sea powers have several advantages over land powers. The pressure on their borders 
tends to be lower than for their continental rivals; in the purest example, islands are 
more secure than landlocked countries. They have access to, and can control, the 
maritime arteries of regional and global commerce, making it possible for them to 
influence the economic welfare of others. They tend to have a more expansive out-
look, thinking of distant lands and seeking faraway markets. They have the means 
to attack a rival state in an unexpected location on its periphery, outflanking it and 
distracting it from its main vector of expansion. And because of their combination 
of range with relative security, sea powers tend to enjoy a diplomatic flexibility that 
a land power, surrounded by enduring enemies, lacks. Mahan, therefore, was not 
wrong when he argued—and in doing so incited envy among the leaders of land 
powers such as late-nineteenth-century Germany—that the great powers in his-
tory tended to be sea powers. Or, as Paul Kennedy qualified it, writing of the late 
nineteenth century, “Sea power, as represented by a large surface fleet, commercial 
activity, naval bases at home and abroad, remained still the best indicator of the 
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relative national power of all those nations who wished to play on the world stage.”5 
And U.S. history continues to demonstrate the benefits of being a sea power with 
access to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the markets located on their shores.
But sea powers also have many handicaps that often are forgotten, resulting 
in a dangerous overestimation of their safety, influence, and staying power in 
a competitive world. From the Athenian Pericles to Germany’s Admiral Alfred 
von Tirpitz, many political leaders placed enormous confidence in the ability 
of maritime command to protect their countries and of naval power to defeat 
their rivals.6 It gave them a false sense of power. A more clear-eyed assessment 
of power—one less enamored of the grandeur associated with naval might— 
often revealed that such hope was unwarranted, and that it often ended up having 
tragic results for the naval aspirant or even the established sea power.
Two weaknesses—or enduring challenges that need to be addressed—have char-
acterized all sea powers in history. First, to be competitive, sea powers have to 
convert their command of the seas into political effects on land—a feat whose 
accomplishment is not automatic and requires certain conditions that often are 
outside the sea power’s control. Second, because of their flexibility in alliances 
and basing, sea powers suffer from a credibility gap that weakens their staying 
power in faraway lands.
Both of these weaknesses revolve around a core problem: that politics occur 
on land, where people live, and commanding the seas does not guarantee the 
desired political outcomes on land.7 A purely continental school of strategy—if it 
emphasizes that the only political, economic, and military dynamics that matter 
occur on land—is certainly too dismissive of the strategic benefits of sea power.8 
But a purely maritime-power grand strategy—if it does not consider how to ad-
dress the fundamental challenge of how to use command of the sea to achieve 
political outcomes on land and does not deal with the inherent limitations of sea 
power—is likely to fail. In sum, political outcomes are achieved on land, and sea 
power, under certain conditions, can be a useful tool.9 Julian S. Corbett, the Brit-
ish naval strategist concerned with how to use maritime power to influence po-
litical dynamics on the European continent, wrote that “[s]ince men live upon the 
land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been 
decided—except in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do against 
your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes 
it possible for your army to do.”10
FROM SEA TO LAND
The first weakness—the challenge of converting sea power into political effect—
is perhaps the most pervasive, and it becomes particularly evident when a sea 
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power competes with a continental rival. Translating superiority on the seas into 
political influence on land is neither automatic nor dependent exclusively on the 
sea power’s skills. In fact, the main determinant of this weakness lies in the nature 
of the sea power’s rival, particularly its exposure to and dependence on the sea. 
As James E. S. Cable put it, the “elephant is not vulnerable to the crocodile until 
his trunk dangles near the water’s edge.”11 The less reliant the rival is on the sea, 
the less vulnerable it is to a maritime blockade, for example. In such cases, from 
the sea power’s point of view, its command of the seas is less useful and offers less 
leverage than it might wish.
Historically, the advantage of sea powers stemmed from the cost-effectiveness 
of maritime navigation and the seaborne transport of goods and forces, as Ma-
han suggested in the quote given previously. Venice, for example, benefited from 
an improvement in navigation in the Mediterranean from the eleventh century 
on, driven by advances in shipbuilding, the enhanced security of key maritime 
passages, and a growing demand for high-value goods, which combined to give 
greater weight to sea-lanes over land routes. Hence, the First Crusade at the end 
of the eleventh century went mostly by land through Constantinople to Jerusa-
lem, while the Third Crusade at the end of the twelfth century proceeded more by 
sea, as did the notorious Fourth Crusade in the early thirteenth century.12 Control 
of the sea, then, bestowed something of enormous value on Venice, or any other 
power capable of holding it, because it provided leverage over other polities that 
relied increasingly on maritime commerce and transport.
A similar dynamic favored Great Britain in the nineteenth century, allowing 
it to turn its maritime dominion into diplomatic supremacy. Like Venice, Great 
Britain rose to great power 
in an era of primitive overland communications. There were few all-weather roads, no 
motor road vehicles, and only the beginnings of a railway grid. Large-scale movement 
of people and bulky freight overland, even for relatively short distances, was slow and 
costly. The advantage of water-borne transport was nearly everywhere decisive. Under 
these conditions blockade of a country’s ports could be a paralyzing experience. Fur-
thermore, it was generally quicker and cheaper in those days to travel around Europe 
than to cross it. Though the island of Britain lies on the periphery of Europe, the su-
perior mobility of movement by sea rendered the British position strategically central 
vis-à-vis every continental country, so long as the British Navy controlled the sea.13
But the strategic advantage of the seas ebbs and flows in history. Land commu-
nications are not perennially inferior and sea-lanes are not inexorably ascendant 
in strategic value. In some historical periods, a sea power may compete with a ri-
val land power that does not rely heavily on the seas, and therefore is less vulner-
able to the sea power. Therefore the ability of a maritime state to wield influence 
is diminished considerably by factors that are outside its control.
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The possibility that sea power would decrease in strategic relevance was en-
visaged by the two most famous geopolitical thinkers, Sir Halford J. Mackin-
der and Admiral Mahan. Both argued broadly that the sea powers on the outer 
edges of Eurasia were outflanking the traditional potentates on the landmass. 
But access to oceanic routes combined with the maintenance of a large navy con-
stituted a form of power that could be withstood, and perhaps at some point 
challenged, by a large, well-organized power located in the continental core. The 
principal threat to maritime dominance therefore was not another power with a 
large navy (although that, of course, could be a cause of intramaritime rivalry) 
but a continental center, impenetrable to a sea power’s sorties, united by well- 
functioning land routes, and economically self-sufficient. Another way to de-
scribe this nineteenth-century competition is that it was between steamships 
and railroads, between the efficiency of naval navigation and the speed of land 
transport. But the general principle has applied throughout history: control of the 
sea matters in a competition between sea and land powers only when maritime 
routes are vital to the latter.
The corollary of this principle is that sea powers have a strong interest in pre-
venting the improvement of land routes that could unify a continental power 
or, more broadly, that would shift commerce away from the sea. But at the same 
time they have a limited ability to shape this balance of advantages between land 
and sea routes. They certainly may try to obstruct the development of conti-
nental commerce and to compensate with technological innovations in mari-
time navigation, but the outcome of this balance does not lie exclusively in their 
own hands. The land power can engage in efforts, such as railroad building in 
nineteenth-century continental Europe or the development of pipelines and 
roads across Eurasia in more-recent decades (e.g., China’s OBOR efforts), that 
are to a large degree impervious to the sea power’s influence and may result in a 
considerable diminishment of its grip over the continent.14
As the continental power’s dependence on and vulnerability to the sea de-
crease, the maritime power has to figure out other ways to exercise pressure on 
land. As a tool, a naval blockade of an enemy is very selective (targeting a spe-
cific power and not others) and low risk (easy to turn on and off); however, it 
works only if the targeted state relies on the sea.15 And in any case, while a naval 
blockade can starve a land power of vital resources, hurting its economy and 
society, on its own it cannot dislodge the rival from a piece of territory or defeat 
it comprehensively. The naval power may hope to be able to change the enemy’s 
behavior by merely showing its ships offshore, coercing the rival by the prom-
ise of punishment, especially along its coastline.16 Modern airpower extends the 
range of naval forces, making targets deep inside the continental mass vulnerable 
and reinforcing the threat of a seaborne standoff attack. But, like a naval-artillery 
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barrage, this is an exercise in targeting that may have limited lasting effects on 
local political dynamics.17 In the end, there may be a need to inflict a defeat on 
the continental power, or at least to establish control over a coastal area, and to 
achieve such an objective airpower and ships floating at a distance do not suf-
fice.18 The mere control of sea-lanes and the threat of a maritime blockade are 
insufficient to influence the behavior of a continental rival that has a limited ex-
posure to and reliance on the sea.
To penetrate the rival state’s continental shell and have a significant effect on its 
political and economic dynamics, sea powers historically had three main options: 
amphibious assaults (resulting in the establishment of a presence) on the enemy’s 
coastal regions, pressure on the rival’s land borders, and control over internal seas.19
Continental Military Presence
The first option is perhaps the most visible, because it involves fleets delivering 
forces onto shore, followed by sieges of cities and other land battles. Usually, 
however, such an attack on a coastal fortress or port has been extremely limited 
in geographic scope, and has not been followed by a massive and lengthy inva-
sion of the rival’s territory. Most historical maritime powers, from Venice to Great 
Britain, focused on ports and other strategic outposts along sea-lanes; they were 
aware that territorial control required manpower and resources that their states 
did not have and that were better used on the sea in any case. Instead, the sea 
power’s purpose was to deprive a rival of a safe harbor so it could damage the 
rival’s fleet, reduce its seaborne commerce by attrition, or both. Of course, 
another gain was a base for its own use. Only rarely, however, could it actually 
overthrow the hostile polity.20
A limited continental commitment permitted the sea power to maintain a focus 
on the maritime realm, keeping control of the sea-lanes and accessing distant mar-
kets and cities. But the disadvantage was that it had a narrow effect on the hostile 
land power, and in fact the absence of a long-term presence on the continent ex-
posed the sea power to the rise of land threats that remained unchecked until the 
only option to deal with them was appeasement.21 For instance, with the excep-
tion of the Fourth Crusade’s targeting the imperial remnants of Byzantium, Venice 
never fully defeated the rival continental power in question, such as the Ottoman 
Empire or Hungary. It could thwart a competitor from accessing and controlling a 
sliver of the sea, or it could inflict a punishing raid on an outpost that was within 
easy reach of the sea, but it could not overpower its enemy.22 Land-based allies are 
a way for sea powers to compensate for a limited continental commitment, but the 
strength of such alliances is tied to the sea power’s guarantee to the allies, dem-
onstrated by its durable physical presence. These land-based allies thus are not 
an alternative to a sea power’s continental commitment but an integral part of it.
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Continental powers can be defeated only by depriving them of land, con-
quering their territories piecemeal, and weakening and devastating their armies 
through battles.23 As a result, maritime powers, whose efforts focus on the sea and 
who often are very sensitive to casualties, are more inclined to use diplomacy to 
conciliate their rivals rather than to embark on a land expedition aimed at territo-
rial conquest and defeat of their enemies. The inherent limitations they have on 
land lead them toward a grand strategy of managing, rather than defeating, their 
continental rivals.
Pressure on the Rival’s Land Frontier
Creating pressure along the rival’s land borders is another option at the disposal 
of the sea power. The goal is to inflict costs on the continental enemy, most im-
portantly to redirect its attention from the sea to its immediate neighbors along 
a land frontier.24 Land borders have a powerful diversionary effect because they 
shape the security of the state’s homeland most immediately. Mahan went so far 
as to suggest “the inability of a state with even a single continental frontier to 
compete in naval development with one that is insular, although of smaller popu-
lations and resources,” indicating the enormous vulnerability any state experi-
ences on its land side.25 A sea power, then, can take advantage of this weakness of 
the enemy by generating pressure on its rival’s land frontier. But usually, because 
of logistical difficulties or a lack of suitable resources, a sea power pursues such a 
strategy indirectly, through the forces of other states or groups. Such an approach 
requires diplomacy—that is, some form of bribery or subsidies—that can con-
vince the rival’s neighbors to push on the land frontier. Or, in some other cases, 
the sea power can create conditions for an exacerbated rivalry on land among 
various powers by inciting conflicts and skillfully shifting its support from one 
side to the other.
Yet ultimately, the outcome is in the hands of other actors, leaving the sea 
power at their mercy and requiring a constant and skillful diplomatic effort to 
keep them either on its side or in conflict with each other. At any point, these 
powers jockeying for control on land can reach a deal to end their conflict, leav-
ing the sea power without a means to exercise influence on the continent. The 
geopolitical nightmare for Great Britain, for instance, was the rise of a conti-
nental alliance—a “thievish partnership” between France and Russia—that would 
cut Britain off from Europe and challenge its interests in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East.26 During World War II, the great fear in London and Washing-
ton was that Stalin would reach a separate peace with Hitler—another Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact—leaving the maritime powers without a way to exert pressure on 
Germany’s eastern land borders.27 Similarly, today the great geopolitical question 
for the United States is whether Russia will be more aligned with China—estab-
lishing a continental entente—rather than maintaining a lengthy land frontier of 
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friction. In brief, relying on another power to establish lasting sources of con-
tinental diversion of a rival is a sometimes necessary but potentially precarious 
strategy for the sea power.
Control of Internal Seas
The third way for a sea power to influence a land rival’s actions is to control the 
internal seas of and the “brown waters” immediately adjacent to the opponent. 
These are waters that either are surrounded by land or pierce the continental 
shell, in the form of bays or channels between coasts and nearby islands. Each 
bay, inlet, or river can become a “dagger into the interior.”28 For the land power, 
they function as internal routes, linking one region to another through water-
ways rather than roads, on top of serving as access points to the wider seas. A 
sea power that establishes naval superiority in such waters can control the move-
ments along the coast and even riverine trade, and by doing so it can impose 
costs on the rival, translating the power of the navy into economic and political 
effects on land.
Throughout history, rivers have enabled crucial extensions of sea power, al-
lowing a maritime state to extend influence along the internal arteries of com-
merce, where a large percentage of the local population also tended to live (e.g., 
the Congo River for the Belgians, the Red [or Hong] River for the French in 
Indochina).29 This is a lesson that Mahan drew from history as well as from his 
personal experience as an officer in the Union navy during the American Civil 
War. In his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters (1883), he describes how the 
Union’s control of coastal waters from Key West to the outlet of the Rio Grande 
and its penetration along the Mississippi River hemmed in the Confederate 
states.30 These Union naval efforts, on top of imposing serious economic costs 
through a blockade of the South, fractured the enemy’s territorial integrity.
But a brown-water strategy also reveals a sea power’s weakness, because it is 
an imperfect substitute for an intervention and presence on land. It works best as 
a joint operation in conjunction with land forces that sea powers, as mentioned 
earlier, often are reluctant to use. Such a limited, or supporting, role was assigned 
to U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean during the early Cold War, to back the 
main efforts of allied forces in a land war in Europe and, in the best-case scenario, 
to open a second front on the southern flank of the USSR to divert some of the 
Soviet forces away from their westward march.31
Moreover, while the naval power can break a continental state’s territorial in-
tegrity by establishing naval superiority in these brown waters, the land power 
equally can deny control of these waters to its rival without having to build a 
matching fleet.32 Often the nature of internal waters, whether bays or larger seas 
circumscribed by land, is such that they can be controlled through a continental 
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strategy of dominating key pieces of real estate. The positioning of land forces, and 
in some cases small littoral fleets, on strategic choke points (such as the Gallip- 
oli Peninsula on the Dardanelles Strait or the deeply embayed Dalmatian coast) 
can serve to harass, and even deny passage to, the sea power’s navy. Such a conti-
nental strategy creates bastions along the littoral that constrain the naval move-
ments of a maritime rival. In the most modern iteration of this approach, a land 
power such as Russia or China can deny access to a maritime power through the 
development of weapons that from the coast can threaten to inflict unacceptable 
costs on a hostile naval force (the so-called antiaccess/area-denial approach).33
An even more ambitious strategy for a land power is to conquer the coast sur-
rounding the sea, challenging the rival state’s naval superiority by denying it access 
to ports and safe harbors. As Napoléon allegedly said in 1806, his goal was “to 
conquer the sea through the power of land.”34 Similarly, the ancient Roman Re-
public pursued a continental, rather than a thalassocentric, strategy, extending 
control over the circumference of the Mediterranean Sea.35 The Russian empire 
also sought to enclose the Black and Baltic Seas from the seventeenth century on.36 
This is a form of sea power by coastal control that continental powers can achieve 
despite the rival’s naval superiority. In fact, naval superiority loses its effectiveness 
in semienclosed seas.37 The competition among great powers as a struggle of na-
vies versus land forces was made more pronounced—while perhaps benefiting the 
land powers more—by the gunpowder revolution and the advent of coastal artil-
lery from the fifteenth century on.38 Another way to put this is that a land power 
can exercise control over internal or semienclosed seas without having naval supe-
riority; it can establish control of the sea without having command of it.
Sea powers’ weakness, then, is that they may be unable to translate their superior-
ity on the seas into political effects on land. And if they cannot project influence 
on land or if they control sea-lanes that are irrelevant to their rivals, then their 
naval capability is an expensive, capital-intensive resource that is of but limited 
use in statecraft. It can bring them wealth and even protect them from potentially 
hostile forces coming from the sea, but beyond this limited defensive role it has 
little influence over the land powers. Hence, Rome succeeded in preventing an 
attack on its home territory from Macedonia, an ally of the Carthaginian Hanni-
bal, simply by positioning a naval squadron in the Adriatic near Brindisi, so that 
“not a soldier of the phalanxes ever set foot in Italy.”39 But such a show of force is 
more useful to prevent an attack than to force the rival to accept more-onerous 
conditions; it is a tool of prevention and deterrence, not of compulsion. As illus-
trated by the fifth-century BC war between Athens and Sparta, control of the sea 
allows the maritime power to survive, but it does not suffice as a means to defeat 
the land rival.40
9
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SEA-POWER FLEXIBILITY AND DIPLOMATIC PERFIDY
Sea powers face a second considerable limitation. Since they are blessed with 
many strategic options of where to project their force, this flexibility decreases 
the credibility of their staying power in any given location.41 This is what the 
English philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon suggested, perhaps inadver-
tently, when he wrote that “he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may 
take as much or as little of the war as he will.”42 The relative ease of movement 
that maritime powers have—for instance, to show up in distant places through 
multiple sea routes—bestows an advantage over a land power that must focus 
on its immediate neighbors.43 The American political scientist Nicholas J. Spyk-
man observed as much when he envisioned the nature of continental expan-
sion as a series of concentric circles, made predictable in their sequencing by 
the necessary contiguity of territorial control. Maritime powers can hop from 
point to point, skipping difficult-to-control outposts or changing their market 
outlets.44 Hence, as the American strategic theorist Admiral J. C. Wylie, USN, 
described it, “the sailor or airman thinks in terms of an entire world, [while] 
the soldier at work thinks in terms of theaters, in terms of campaigns, or in 
terms of battles.”45
But this tactical luxury of high mobility has diplomatic costs. The possibility 
of moving away with little effort also can translate into an easy exit for a maritime 
power. This flexibility can be interpreted as fecklessness. As a result, every time 
a maritime power establishes a presence on a distant coast or island, it does so 
under the shadow of doubt regarding the strength of its long-term commitment. 
And even when a sea power is locked in a relentless competition with a continen-
tal rival, its limitations mentioned earlier push it toward a policy of managing the 
rival—which at times may include appeasing and even aligning with it. The dif-
ficulty that sea powers have in defeating a continental power makes them at least 
seem unreliable to other polities that may be in the path of a given land power’s 
expansionistic impulses. Unreliability can translate into diplomatic perfidy, with 
the sea power committing to land-based alliances but lacking either the capacity 
to protect allies fully from their continental rival or the will to devote sufficient 
resources to defeat the enemy.
The simplest geographic variable—distance—affects not just the abil-
ity to deliver power (the effect of the so-called power gradient: the farther 
the projection of power, the more costly and less effective it is) but also cred-
ibility. Venice, for instance, had an easier time convincing its rivals of its com-
mitment to maintaining a monopoly over trade at the nearby outlet of the Po 
River than it did of its intention to maintain its long-term presence in the Ae-
gean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean islands. Maintaining its stato da mar 
possessions in the Mediterranean required constant efforts and repeated 
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reconquests. Rebellious indigenous populations (e.g., in Crete) may have calcu-
lated—like every guerrilla force in history—that their commitment to their own 
islands was infinitely firmer than that of the distant Venetians.46
The relative weakness of credibility consumes resources because sea powers 
have to use force constantly to demonstrate their willingness to stay in a distant 
place. Thus, being a sea power is an expensive proposition, not only because of 
the costs associated with maintaining a superior naval force, but also because of 
the unremitting demands to show presence in faraway lands, to maintain cus-
tody over vital ports, and to respond to recurrent mutinies in distant outposts.
The protection the seas offer gives the maritime power the leeway to aban-
don allies without suffering a dramatic loss of security. Whether the allies ac-
tually are abandoned is less relevant than the reputation for unreliability that 
attaches to a sea power. It was just such a reputation that gave England the 
moniker “Perfidious Albion.” As seventeenth-century French bishop Jacques-
Bénigne Bossuet put it in a sermon, “England, perfidious England, which the 
ramparts of her seas made inaccessible to the Romans.”47 The security that the 
sea provides goes hand in hand with a latent detachment—which others often 
interpret as perfidy.
The grip of sea powers over the continents is precarious, even when they 
dominate the oceans. They can endure protracted great-power competitions, 
win wars, accumulate the most fabulous fortunes, establish footholds in the far-
thest ends of the earth, and even become objects of jealous emulation for states 
locked in a continental bastion. But they also have serious limitations that stem 
from their very nature as masters of the seas, because their maritime strength 
has limited effects on land. There are, of course, answers to these constraints, 
ranging from vying for control of inland seas to keeping some presence on the 
continent, but they only mitigate the limitations, which remain as enduring 
features of maritime powers. The American historian Theodore Ropp alleg-
edly would walk into his classroom, point to a world map, and announce to his 
students that “everything blue belongs to us.” The problem, of course, was how 
to translate such control of the “blue” into a victory that included control over 
the “brown” and the “green.”48
The logical conclusion of this analysis of a sea power’s limits is that two 
conditions must be present (although not necessarily simultaneously) for a sea 
power to have an effective strategy and to compete successfully with a land 
rival. First, the sea power must maintain a continental presence.49 The extent 
and scope of that presence will vary, as they necessarily are linked to the pecu-
liarities of the moment; the effort may require massive physical presence (e.g., 
American involvement in the European campaign in World War II), aid to 
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guerrillas (e.g., the British approach in the early-nineteenth-century Peninsular 
War), or large bases and powerful allies (e.g., the late-twentieth-century U.S. 
approach). But without such a presence, the translation of maritime power into 
continental influence is sporadic at best and impossible at worst.
The second condition is that the continental rival must be exposed to the sea 
and be vulnerable to a threat of disruption of its access to sea-lanes. The assess-
ment of this second condition should shape the sea power’s efforts on the first 
condition; the less vulnerable to the sea the land power is, the greater the neces-
sity for the sea power to have a continental presence. For example, the USSR 
was not very dependent on maritime commerce, and thus was less susceptible 
to the threat of a naval blockade. Moreover, its main vectors of expansion were 
on the Eurasian landmass, with internal lines of communication, and hence its 
efforts were less vulnerable to Western maritime interdiction. Thus, the United 
States had to have a large continental presence in Europe to exercise deterrence 
and influence Soviet behavior. Now, China’s economy is more vulnerable to the 
sea, and an American naval presence demonstrating our command of the seas 
is our primary effort at affecting its behavior. But if Beijing firms up its control 
over land routes linking China with the rest of Eurasia, creating a continental 
core, American naval forces floating in the Pacific Ocean will have considerably 
less effect on its decisions and behavior.
Eventually, the risk all sea powers face is that they will end up like the 
French man-of-war positioned off the African coast described by the Polish-
British writer Joseph Conrad. “In the empty immensity of earth, sky, and water, 
there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent.” Nothing happened, of 
course, because “nothing could happen,” even though there must have been a 
“camp of natives . . . hidden out of sight somewhere.”50 “Firing into the conti-
nent” is an activity that may give the impression of might, but in fact has little 
impact.
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